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A
Vapour cloud explosion which occurred in a large fuel storage area close to the
harbour of Naples (Italy) was analysed by different methods. Useful ‘experimental
data’ were obtained by the post-accident damage analysis (minimum overpressure
experienced by different items) and by the seismograms recorded at different stations at the
time of explosion (explosion duration and intensity).
The analysis of the seismic data allowed a  rst estimate of the amount of vaporized fuel. A
more accurate estimate was obtained by modelling the rate of evaporation of the liquid fuel and
the vapour cloud dispersion in the surrounding atmosphere. The dispersion calculation
furnished the input data for the CFD gas explosion simulator AutoReagas and constituted the
basis for a sensitivity analysis of the results to the amount of fuel involved in the explosion.
The results obtained with the different methods above were critically discussed and
compared to the results obtained with the Multi-Energy method.
Keywords: VCE; CFD simulation; fuel storage area; post-accident analysis; seismic effects of
explosion; heavy gas dispersion.
INTRODUCTION
Vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) have to be considered as a
major hazard in industrial plants where large amounts of
 ammable materials are stored or processed1. In fact, many
VCEs which occurred in the last two decades in fuel storage
areas caused almost total destruction of the plant.
The damage analyses for VCEs are generally performed
by adopting simpli ed calculation procedures such as the
TNT-equivalency (TNT) and the Multi-Energy (ME)
methods2. Recently, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
codes have also been considered for this purpose. The CFD
approach should allow a higher accuracy for the design of
chemical plants, for the identi cation of the needs of
protective systems, and for post-accident analysis. How-
ever, the performance of the CFD codes speci cally
developed for VCE simulation in congested environments
is affected by the different combustion models and
turbulence closure models adopted. Moreover, few model-
ling constants for the computation of turbulence and for the
description of the complex interaction between  ame front
and turbulent  ow  eld are introduced. These constants
must be adjusted on the basis of experimental data and
according to the results of properly designed analyses of
sensitivity3,4.
The CFD code AutoReagas was used in the present work
for the simulation of a VCE, which occurred on 21
December 1985 in a fuel storage area in Naples (Italy).
Since the case history of the accident has been presented in
detail elsewhere5,6, only the main aspects will be reported
here, while particular emphasis will be placed on the
procedure adopted for VCE analysis and simulation.
THE CASE HISTORY
On 21 December 1985, a VCE occurred in a fuel storage
area located in the vicinity of Naples (Italy). The affected
area (Figure 1) covered about 49,000 m2 and contained 37
tanks used for the storage of gasoline, diesel fuel and fuel
oil, with a total capacity of about 100,000 m3. Two
buildings, a loading unit and two rail tanks were also
present. The whole area was highly con ned by walls,
buildings and by an embankment, with a mean height of
about 8 m.
The accident originated from a spill of gasoline that
occurred during a  lling operation from a ship berthed in the
harbour of Naples. Gasoline over owed through the  oating
roof of tank no. 17 (Figure 1) for about 1.5 h, and the total
amount of spilled fuel was estimated to be about 700 tons.
The resulting pool covered the catch basin of the tank and
the adjacent pumping area, which were connected through a
drain duct. The formation of a large homogeneous vapour
cloud was favoured by the relatively high ambient
temperature (8°C), by the low wind speed (2 m s–1) and by
a long delay prior to the ignition. The latter occurred in the
proximity of pumping station no. 2. The strong VCE and the
following  re, which lasted over one week, destroyed all the
buildings and the equipment within the area. The associated
blast wave caused 5 casualties within the area, whereas
minor effects were observed up to 5 km away.
A damage analysis was carried out after the accident5,6.
The overpressures estimated by this analysis are reported in
Table 1 for some signi cant locations inside the storage area
and compared with the results of the CFD and ME analyses,
discussed later. Particularly, the minimum overpressure
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required for tank failure is reported for some characteristic
tanks.
THE SEISMIC WAVE
When a VCE occurs, a small part of the released energy is
transferred to the soil in the form of a seismic wave while
another part is transmitted through the atmosphere as a blast
wave. If the released energy is large enough, both waves can
be recorded by seismographs located at different distances
from the explosion, and useful information can be derived
from these records about the explosion duration and energy.
In the case history under examination, the seismic wave
was clearly observed up to about 100 km from the explosion
epicentre. Figure 2 shows the waves recorded at seismic
stations located 9 km, 29 km and 82 km respectively away
from the storage area.
The soil wave travels at a much higher velocity (of the
order of 5 3 103 km s–1) than the air blast wave (which
travels at the speed of sound) and hence it was recorded
earlier. However, the seismic wave usually undergoes
strong re ection and distortion phenomena so that the
resulting signal is much more disturbed than the corre-
sponding air record.
The signal recorded at the nearest station (curve (d) of
Figure 2) was too much distorted to obtain useful
information, whereas the one recorded 82 km away (curve
(a) of Figure 2) showed only a small disturbance. On the
contrary, useful information could be obtained from the
seismic data recorded at the station located 29 km from the
explosion site (curves (b) and (c) of Figure 2).
The air blast wave record gives an explosion duration of
about 4 s. Furthermore, the Richter magnitude, M, of an
earthquake equivalent to the explosion can be measured
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Table 1. Observed damages and peak overpressures (Pmax) estimated by damage analysis and calculated by CFD simulation.
CFD analysis
Homogenous cloud
Height Height Height Non Homog. ME analysis
Estimated 4 m 6 m 8 m Cloud Cloud height
Observation point Observed damage Pmax, kPa Pmax, kPa Pmax, kPa Pmax, kPa Pmax, kPa Pmax, kPa
Damage analysis
Main building Partial demolition 5.0 1.4 4.7 5.5 2.5 62
Guar–rail motorway Damaged 7.0 6.0 24.7 9.8 5.1 60
Lubricant storage Damaged 11.0 4.2 5.1 9.3 3.4 63
building roof
Support of gravity tanks Damaged 11.0 2.0 6.7 10.8 8.4 73
Rail tanks Damaged 48.0 3.3 18.5 60.0 11.1 65
Tank 3 Destroyed >4.1 2.6 4.3 16.5 9.5 77
Tank 4 Destroyed >38.0 8.1 20.7 51.5 5.9 69
Tank 17 Destroyed – 10.3 14.7 28.0 13.2 –
Tank 20 Destroyed >1.9 2.8 4.3 4.7 2.6 76
Tank 101 Deformed >1.8 1.4 2.5 3.5 2.6 75
Ignition point – – 24.6 32.8 60.0 6.5 –
Glass (up to 1 km) Destroyed 3 – – – – 4
Window frames Destroyed <10 – – – – 9
(up to 500 m)
Shed roof (600 m) Destroyed <10 – – – – 8
Figure 1. Layout of the fuel storage area. The numbered tanks are included in Table 1.
from the seismogram, according to the following equation7:
M = log10 a+ c1 log10 L + c2 (1)
where a is the maximum amplitude of the signal, L is the
distance of the seismograph from the explosion site, and c1
and c2 are constants which depend on the local position of
the seismic station. By using equation (1), a value of
M=3.54 (Richter scale) is obtained.
The seismic energy ES can be estimated by means of
equation (2), obtained from the analysis of arti cial
(underground or surface) explosions of trinitrotoluene
(TNT)8:
log10 ES = 4.78 + 2.57mexp (2)
where mexp is the explosion magnitude, which is related to
M by the simple equation:
mexp = 0.56M + 2.5 (3)
Equations (2) and (3) yield an explosion magnitude
mexp = 4.48 and a seismic energy ES=1.97 3 103MJ.
The seismic behaviour of an atmospheric explosion
located near the earth surface is similar to a shallow
earthquake8. Indeed, only a small fraction of the total energy
is transferred into seismic energy, because the largest
fraction is converted into thermal energy and air blast
energy. The seismic coupling factor a, i.e. the ratio of
seismic to total energy, may vary considerably from case
to case and strongly depends on soil characteristics.
According to Bath7, the value a=0.1 can be assumed for
shallow underground explosions if the source is located
within 10 to 40 km from the measuring point. In the case
under study, this value has been con rmed by independent
evaluation performed on the basis of soil composition in the
area of the explosion6,9. Hence, a total explosion energy of
about 2.0 3 104MJ can be calculated, which corresponds to
4.2 tons of TNT.
The amount of  ammable vapour involved in an
explosion of known energy can be evaluated through an
explosion ef ciency or yield factor, g. When using the TNT-
equivalence method, values in the range 0.05 –0.1 are
usually adopted, whereas larger values are only considered
when safe and conservative estimates are needed (for
instance, separation distances between nuclear power plants
and transport routes)10-15. This gives an exploded mass of
4.2–8.4 tons (heat of combustion of gasoline vapour=
46.4 MJ kg–1).
These values do not disagree with the ME method, which
uses a larger value of g (typically 0.2) but also assumes that
the explosion strength is essentially determined by the
fraction of vapour constrained in the congested parts of the
 ammable cloud2,10.
THE CALCULATION OF THE VAPOUR MASS
The calculation of the vapour mass involved in the
explosion is crucial in order to assess the consequences of
such accidents. In the previous section, a  rst estimate was
obtained from the seismic data recorded at various stations.
A more accurate value can be obtained by computing the
evaporation rate of gasoline during the fuel spilling.
The evaporation rate per unit area, R, can be evaluated
by considering two contributions deriving, respectively,
from the pool and from the liquid falling along the
tank surface. According to Opschoor16, the general relation-
ship holds:
R = kWPt
RgT
ln 1 +P
° 2 P`
Pt 2 P `( ) (4)
where Rg is the ideal gas constant, W is the vapour molecular
weight, T is the liquid temperature, Pt is the ambient
pressure, P° is the gasoline vapour pressure at the liquid
temperature, P` is the partial pressure of the evaporated
liquid far from the liquid surface, and k is the mass transfer
coef cient.
As far as the pool evaporation term is concerned, the mass
transfer coef cient can be computed as16:
k = 0.002 3 v 0.78L2 0.11p (5)
where v is the wind velocity at the height of 10 m from
ground and Lp is the pool size. On the basis of the post-
accident analysis6, the value Lp=60 m was assumed since
the pool covered the entire catch basin of the tank no.17 and
the adjacent pumping area. Application of equation (5)
yields for k the value 2.2 3 10–3m s–1.
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Figure 2. Seismic signals recorded at different distances from the explosion epicentre: (a) 82 km — soil blast wave; (b) 29 km — soil blast wave; (c) 29 km —
air blast wave; (d) 9 km — soil blast wave.
A larger value is expected for the mass transfer
coef cient related to the evaporation from the tank surface,
because of the more favourable  ow condition. The value
k=5 3 10–3m s–1 was obtained for the ‘winter-type’ gaso-
line considered here (W=68 g mol–1), by applying the
Chilton-Colburn analogy to a liquid  lm evaporating on a
vertical cylinder17.
Finally, by using equation (4) with P` << P°
(P°(8°C)=77 kPa) and P ` << Pt, one obtains for the overall
evaporation rates the values of 20 kg s–1 and 5 kg s–1
respectively from the pool and from the tank wall. If the
spill lasted for about 1.5 hours, the values above correspond
to a total evaporated mass of about 135 tons.
This value is more than one order of magnitude larger
than that estimated from the seismic energy. Actually, the
 ammable vapour cloud is usually constituted by a small
fraction of the total vaporized liquid, due to the atmospheric
dilution. Thus, in order to assess with a higher accuracy the
size of the  ammable vapour cloud, a gas dispersion
analysis should be carried out, as discussed in the next
section.
VAPOUR CLOUD DISPERSION ANALYSIS
The  ammable portion of the vapour cloud generated by
the gasoline evaporation was calculated by performing a
cloud dispersion analysis. The software HEGADAS,
developed by SHELL Research (HGSYSTEM)18 and
speci cally devoted to heavy gas dispersion calculations,
was used for this purpose. All details about the model
features are reported in the literature19.
An evaporating pool of gasoline with an evaporation rate
of 25 kg s–1 was considered as the source of the vapour
cloud, according to the results of the previous section. In
fact, the HEGADAS code does not allow the speci cation of
two distinct evaporation sources, which would be necessary
to describe the case under examination. Thus, it does not
allow the speci cation of a distributed vapour source along
the vertical axis, that would correspond to the evaporation
term from the tank shell. This probably leads to under-
estimating the cloud height.
A steady-state calculation was carried out because of the
long evaporation time prior to the ignition. The input data
adopted for the simulation are reported in Table 2.
The average surface roughness zr accounts for the
presence of several obstacles such as dykes, tanks, buildings
and pipes, which hinder the vapour cloud spreading. The
adopted value (zr=1 m) is suggested in the reference
manual18 in the case of industrial sites, and approximately
corresponds to 1/10 of the height of a typical obstacle (i.e.,
the fuel tanks). However, the sensitivity of HEGADAS with
respect to zr appeared to be very small. In fact, when
decreasing zr to 0.5 m the amount and the volume of
 ammable vapour changed by only 2.5% and 7%,
respectively.
The in uence of real obstacles on the gas dispersion
process would be better accounted for by means of a CFD
dispersion code. At present, three-dimensional heavy gas
dispersion models have been proposed in the literature20
but their application to congested environments calculations
is still under investigation, mainly due to the lack of
experimental validation21.
Figure 3 shows the results of the dispersion calculation, in
terms of cloud width and height along the downwind
direction. The portion of cloud characterized by a fuel
concentration (C) between the Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL) and the Upper Flammability Limit (UFL) is reported.
With the values listed in Table 2, a total volume of about
45,000 m3 and a total amount of 4 tons of  ammable vapour
were calculated, in good agreement with the fuel amount as
estimated by the seismic analysis previously reported. These
results were used as input data for the VCE numerical
simulation performed by the CFD code AutoReagas.
CFD SIMULATION BY AUTOREAGAS
The VCE was simulated by means of the AutoReagas
CFD code22, speci cally developed by TNO-PML (NL) and
by Century Dynamics Ltd (UK) in order to obtain reliable
predictions of the pressure  eld generated by the VCE.
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Figure 3. (a) Centre line vapour cloud height along the downwind direction.
(b) Vapour cloud footprint on the fuel storage area as reproduced by CFD,
1 m above the ground.
Table 2. Input data for the steady state heavy
gas dispersion calculation.
Air temperature, °C 8
Ground temperature, °C 10
Relative humidity, % 70
Wind velocity, m s–1 2
Surface roughness, m 1
Pasquill stability class D
Spill  ow rate, m3 h–1 750
Pool length, m 60
AutoReagas uses the k-e model23 to describe the turbulent
 ow  eld and the turbulent burning velocity, St, to
characterize the mixture reactivity24.
The relationship between St and the volume based
combustion rate (to be included in the mass conservation
equation) introduces a dimensionless constant, Ct, which is
the main modelling parameter. According to the results of a
sensitivity analysis4,5, the value Ct =100 has been used in
the present work.
The storage site was reproduced by AutoReagas by using
a computational domain of 115 3 63 3 11 planes along the x,
y and z axes, respectively (Figure 4). The z axis (vertical
axis) was extended up to 25 m to account for the upward
expansion of the burned gases, which is horizontally
hindered by the con nement. Within the volume where
the combustion reaction takes place, a computational cubic
cell (side: 2 m) was considered, whereas a graded grid was
used in the far- eld, where only the air blast effect must be
accounted for.
Pipelines, equipment, catch basin walls and all other
objects smaller than the computational cell size were treated
with a sub-grid formulation. This introduces as parameters
the fraction Fk of the turbulent energy which is lost by drag
(to be included as a source term in the k-e model), a
characteristic turbulent length scale LT and a drag coef-
 cient CD for any object
25.
The adopted values (Fk=0.5, CD ranging from 1 to 2,
LT=20% of the cross  ow dimension) were chosen
according to the suggestions of a wide literature3–5,25–28.
A pure butane vapour cloud was used for the CFD
simulations, because butane represented the main compo-
nent of the vapours generated by the winter-type gasoline
involved in the explosion.
Following the results of the dispersion analysis reported
in the previous section, a 300 m wide, 120 m long, strati ed
vapour cloud was considered. AutoReagas does not allow
the speci cation of a continuous concentration pro le
within the cloud. Therefore, the strati cation was obtained
by specifying three regions with concentrations of 7%
(rich mixture just above the gasoline pool), 3.1% (stoichio-
metric) and 2.5%v/v, respectively. Cloud ignition was
assumed at pumping station no. 2, according to the col-
lected testimonies5,6.
Table 1 reports the results in terms of computed
maximum overpressures (Pmax) at speci c locations inside
the storage area. The computed overpressures which
resulted were signi cantly lower than the corresponding
values estimated by the damage analysis. CFD codes have
been mainly validated against experimental data obtained at
stoichiometric fuel concentration, so that only rather
inaccurate predictions can be made for the  ame speeds in
the presence of local mixing in con ned environments.
Thus, numerical simulations were also performed by
considering homogeneous stoichiometric clouds. Three
different heights of 4 m, 6 m and 8 m were assumed,
corresponding to fuel amounts ranging from 4 to 8 tons, also
according to the analysis of the seismic data. Results in
terms of maximum overpressures are reported in Table 1.
By increasing the fuel amount available for combustion,
the maximum generated overpressure is also increased for
all locations considered inside the area. In particular, the
results obtained with the 8 m height cloud con guration
showed the best agreement with the overpressures estimated
by the damage analysis. This result seems to con rm that the
cloud height calculated by the dispersion analysis is
underestimated, probably due to the presence of obstacles,
which could not be included in the dispersion model.
Application of the ME method to predict the peak
overpressures for the 8 m cloud was also performed by using
the GAME29 correlations, developed by TNO (NL) on the
basis of MERGE and E-MERGE experimental data set30.
The maximum source overpressure inside the vapour
cloud was predicted to be 82 kPa, which corresponds to an
explosion strength F between 6 and 7. As shown in Table 1,
the ME method overestimated all the explosion over-
pressures observed within (or immediately close to) the
vapour cloud, whereas, according to the aims of the method,
a rather good prediction of the overpressures was observed
at distances larger than 500 m from the explosion centre.
The explosion duration computed by CFD was about 3–4
seconds, i.e., a value very similar to the total duration of the
air blast wave recorded at the seismic observatory located
29 km apart the explosion site. This value strongly disagrees
with the corresponding ME results. In fact, for the observed
values of F (6 < F < 7), which are consistent with the
observed damages, the explosion duration at the ignition
source should be of the order of 0.1 s.
Thus, it can be argued that those small-scale explosions
simulated by the ME approach (which occur in very short
times, involving very small volumes) are averaged by
AutoReagas at a time-scale consistent with the dimensions
of the adopted computational cell.
CONCLUSIONS
Vapour cloud explosions are very complex phenomena,
whose destructive potential depends on the  ammable mass
involved, on the cloud dispersion and on the reactivity of the
gaseous mixture. A consistent explanation of the incident
can be obtained with appropriate use of different modelling
approaches.
The CFD codes, such as the AutoReagas code employed
here, can give a more accurate simulation of the VCEs, as
compared with empirical correlation. However, the results
depend to some extent on the adopted computational
strategy, which is de ned mainly by the grid dimensions,
by the sub-grid description of the congested areas, and by
the values of a few input parameters.
Among those parameters, the concentration, size and
location of the vapour cloud play an important role.
Accurate modelling of the fuel evaporation and of the
dispersion phenomena leading to the vapour cloud forma-
tion could yield those data. In this  eld, marked improve-
ments are expected by 3-D models, which are able to
account for the effect of partially con ned environments.
Moreover, further investigations are required in order to
develop adequate models for  ame front propagation
through non-homogeneous fuel-air mixtures to be included
within CFD codes speci cally devoted to VCE simulation.
NOMENCLATURE
a amplitude of the seismic signal, mm
C concentration, % v/v
c1, c2 seismographic constants in equation (1)
CD drag coef cient
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Ct dimensionless turbulent constant in equation (7)
ES seismic energy, MJ
F explosion strength (ME method)
Fk fraction of turbulent kinetic energy loss by drag
k mass transfer coef cient, m s–1
LFL Lower Flammability Limit, % v/v
Lp pool size, m
LT turbulent length scale, m
M earthquake Richter magnitude
mexp explosion magnitude
P ` partial pressure of the evaporated liquid far from the pool surface,
kPa
P° vapour pressure, kPa
Pmax maximum overpressure, kPa
Pt ambient pressure, kPa
R speci c evaporation rate, kg s–1m–2
Rg ideal gas constant, J K
–1mol–1
St turbulent  ame speed, m s
–1
T temperature, K
UFL Upper Flammability Limit, % v/v
v Wind velocity, m s–1
W molecular weight, g mol–1
zr average surface roughness, m
a seismic coupling factor
g explosion ef ciency or explosion yield factor
L distance of the seismograph from the explosion site (km)
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